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ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE MEASURES AFTER THE
TUNA/DOLPHIN DECISION
FREDERIC L. KiRGIS, JR.*
The recent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) panel decision
on United States import restrictions of tuna (tuna/dolphin case)' is the leading
participant in the current environment and trade drama. This paper will briefly
address that decision, and then will turn to the international legislative process,
if it may be called that, in the environment and trade field.
The GATT panel in the tuna/dolphin case concluded that the United States
had acted inconsistently with the GATT by applying import restrictions on
tuna caught by methods that kill significant numbers of dolphins.2 The restric-
tions violated GATT Article XI, which prohibits most quantitative import or
export restrictions. The GATT panel also held that the United States could not
justify its action under the GATT Article XX exceptions for measures necessary
to protect animal life and for measures relating to the conservation of exhaust-
ible natural resources.
3
I. Tii UNILATERAL ALTERNATIVE TO IMPORT REsnucTIoNs
The GATT panel decision is not quite the environmental disaster that some
have portrayed it to be. Professor John Jackson's paper. points out some of
the ways in which the impact of the decision could be softened, including the
possible adoption of a GATT waiver that would permit at least some types of
unilateral action for environmental protection purposes.
4
Another avenue for possible unilateral action does not seem to be precluded
by the panel decision. This is not to say that unilateral action is necessarily
the preferred solution. It is only a second-best solution, in the absence of
meaningful, cost-efficient and widely accepted multilateral environmental or
conservation regulations that are buttressed by some fair and effective form of
enforcement mechanism. Regrettably, such multilateral regulations are few and
far between at present.
Unilateral environmental and conservation measures do not have to be in
the form of regulations requiring specific conduct. The United States tuna/
* Law School Association Alumni Professor, Washington and Lee University School of
Law.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereafter Tuna/Dolphin Panel-
Report].
2. The United States acted pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. §§1361-1407 (1988).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(b), (g), 61 Stat. All,
A61, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 262.
4. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WAws. & LEE L. R-v. 1227 (1992).
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dolphin measures were in that form, however, regulating the conduct of
American tuna fishing interests and prohibiting certain tuna imports. That is
why the GATT panel concluded that they were inconsistent with the GATT
Article XI proscription against quantitative import restrictions. But essentially
the same goals could be served by domestic taxation. A tax could be devised
that would be calibrated to the approximate number of dolphins caught and
killed by tuna fishing methods, such as the use of purse seine nets, which are
deemed to be unduly destructive of dolphins swimming above or with the tuna.
The tax could be applied to the sale of tuna products in the United States,
whether the tuna had been caught by fishing boats from the United States or
from any other country.
To be economically efficient, the tax should bear at least some relation to
the marginal value to the world community of the lost dolphins. That value
may not be easy to estimate, but precision need not be sought in such matters.
If even a close estimate could be made, fishing interests would have an economic
incentive to use dolphin-safe fishing methods, as long as the marginal cost of
doing so was less than the per-unit tax. Even if fishing interests did not change
their methods, at least there would be a public fund from the tax receipts that
could be used for dolphin conservation or other environmental goals.
Although compatibility with the GATT is not entirely free from doubt,
the tax should be held compatible so long as it (a) is imposed directly on
products, (b) does not discriminate in favor of American and against foreign
fishing interests, and (c) does not discriminate in favor of products of some
foreign flagships and against others. The tax should be compatible with GATT
even though the tax is geared to tuna "production" processes rather than to
characteristics of the tuna.
This might seem inconsistent with the GATT tuna/dolphin panel's approach
to the United States regulation of imported tuna. The panel said that the
GATT Article 111(4) requirement of national treatment for imported products
in connection with domestic regulations "calls for a comparison of the treatment
of imported tuna as a product with that of domestic tuna as a product."'5 But
this was said in the context of determining that the United States regulation
was a quantitative restriction on imports under Article XI rather than an
internal regulation under Article III. The issue would be different if a domestic
tax were involved. Article XI does not apply to taxes. The GATT provisions
that limit domestic fiscal measures relating to imports (other than antidumping
and countervailing duties) are Articles I, II, and III.
A tax would be subject to the national treatment requirement of Article
111(2). In-1970 a GATT working party, in a report adopted by the GATT
Contracting Parties, concluded that "taxes directly levied on products [are]
eligible for tax adjustment" under Article Ii(2).6 The tuna/dolphin panel relied
on that determination. It said:
5. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 5.15, at 1618.
6. Report of the GATT Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, GATr Doc. L/3464
(Dec. 2, 1970) (adopted by Contracting Parties), BAsic INSTRUmNS AND SELEC=T DocUmENTs
[hereinafter BISD] 18th Supp. 97, 100.
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Thus, under the national treatment principle of Article III, contracting
parties may apply border tax adjustments with regard to those taxes
that are borne by products, but not for domestic taxes not directly
levied on products (such as corporate income taxes).
7
An earlier GATT panel in the environmental context also relied on the
working party report. It said:
As these conclusions of the Contracting Parties clearly indicate, the
tax adjustment rules of the General Agreement distinguish between
taxes on products and taxes not directly levied on products; they do
not distinguish between taxes with different policy purposes. Whether
a sales tax is levied on a product for general revenue purposes or to
encourage the rational use of environmental resources, is therefore not
relevant for the determination of the eligibility of a tax for border tax
adjustment.8
The context for this statement was a tax on chemicals, which themselves could
pollute the environment of the importing country. Thus, one might argue that
the panel's view would not legitimize a tax on a product that is not itself a
pollutant. But a tax on a product that is produced by an environmentally-
harmful process is no less a tax directly on the product than is a tax on a
product that is itself an environmental hazard. Article 111(2) requires only that
the tax actually be on the product and that it not exceed the charge on the
similar domestic product.9
The equal treatment of all foreign flag states should satisfy the most-
favored-nation requirement of GATT Article I. This is the thrust of the tuna/
dolphin panel's treatment of United States requirements for the labeling of
tuna. The United States Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act 0 gave
the right to use the label "Dolphin Safe" for tuna harvested in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) only if it was shown not to have been caught
with purse seine nets harmful to dolphins. The GATT panel said that because
the regulation was tied to the unique circumstances of the ETP (the only ocean
area in which dolphins swim with tuna and thus are knowingly caught when"
purse seine nets are used), it did not discriminate against countries fishing in
that area. Moreover, 'because the labeling regulations applied to all countries
whose vessels fished in the ETP, they did not distinguish between products
originating in different countries." In other words, if a conservation or envi-
ronmental measure applies equally to the products of foreign states produced
7. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 5.13, at 1618.
8. Report of the GA7T Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, para. 5.2.4, GATT Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987), BISD 34th Supp. 136, 161, 27 I.L.M.
1601, 1614 (1988).
9. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries:
International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 MICH. L. REv. 859,
899-900 (1972).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. 11 1990).
11. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 5.43, at 1622.
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by equivalent processes under equivalent circumstances, it will pass most-
favored-nation muster.
2
If the tax is permissible under GATT Article 111(2), and if it is calibrated
to conservation or environmental externalities in both the domestic and foreign
production processes, it should not be found inconsistent with GATT Article
II. Under Article II, GATT parties are required to honor import duties bound
pursuant to GATT negotiations. Article 11(2) disclaims any intent to preclude
charges equivalent to internal taxes imposed consistently with Article III(2).11
Of course, a tax scheme of this sort need not be limited to the tuna/
dolphin situation. It could be applied in a variety of cases where foreign
regulation or taxation of environmental or conservation externalities in the
production process falls substantially below United States standards, as long as
the externalities can reasonably be evaluated in monetary terms, and the product
is produced both in the United States and abroad. The tax would be easiest
to calibrate, and therefore easiest to justify under the GATT, if it were imposed
on items produced under industrial and environmental circumstances similar to
those prevailing in the United States-as might be found in other industrialized
countries. Better yet, it could avoid the charge of imposing United States
standards on the world if it simply enforced agreed international conservation
or environmental standards. The problem, of course, is that there are very few
agreed standards.
II. STREAMNED Mu LTiLATERA RULE MAKING
The GATT panel in the tuna/dolphin case was sensitive to the possible
charge of engaging in judicial legislation if it were to open the Article XX
exceptions enough to justify the American import restriction on tuna. Better,
the panel said, to leave such things to the international legislative process.' 4
But what legislative process? As Professor Jackson has pointed out in his
paper, within the existing GATT system the choices are essentially to amend
GATT's substantive provisions or to establish a waiver that would permit
certain deviations from the normal GATT rules." Another possibility would
be to append a new rule-making procedure to the GATT that would establish
a streamlined method of making and amending rules in the environment and
trade area, and perhaps in any other area that must adapt to changing
technology.
A relatively streamlined rule-making method has been used successfully in
some other international organizations. A framework convention establishes
basic rules and principles, much as the GATT already does in the trade field.
A body is set up within the administering organization to consider more detailed
12. This conclusion differs from the one hesitantly reached in Kirgis, supra note 9, at 896-
97. The Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report has clarified the law on this issue.
13. See Kirgis, supra note 9, at 898-900 (noting difficulty of calibrating tax in such cases).
14. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 1, para. 6.3, at 1623. See generally Geoffrey
Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992).
15. See Jackson, supra note 4, at 1244-45.
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rules, often reflecting new technology, and later amendments to these rules as
human needs change and technology develops. The detailed rules and amend-
ments do not have to go through the normal treaty-making process of signature
plus ratification by each state that is to become a party to them. Instead, they
are adopted by the administering body, which need not consist of all parties
to the framework convention. They are then submitted to all parties with a
time limit within which states must object if they do not wish to be bound. A
state may opt out by objecting, and if a certain percentage of states parties-
say one-third-do object, the rule or amendment would not enter into force
for any states.
This model has been used for nearly half a century in the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for rules governing a wide variety of civil
aviation activities. The rules and recommended practices are adopted by the
ICAO Council, a body currently consisting of thirty-three member states, and
enter into force unless a majority of the total ICAO membership objects.
6
Almost all independent states in the world are members.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has similar procedures for
amendments to some marine pollution rules, although in the IMO all states
that will be subject to the amendments are entitled to participate in the body
formulating them.'7 Rarely, if ever, have states objected to ICAO or IMO
rules or amendments formulated in this way, in large part because they are
carefully prepared by experts and are circulated to all states for their input
well in advance of their adoption. They tend to cover matters that are less
political than GATT environment and trade issues, but one should not pass
them off as inapplicable to GATT simply on that ground. Particularly in the
case of IMO amendments to rules on marine pollution, powerful domestic
interest groups are affected, and yet the streamlined rule-making process has
worked reasonably well. If it can work there, it has at least a reasonable
chance of working in the GATT.
This procedure could supply a multilateral alternative to unilateral regula-
tion or taxation by importing states, designed to internalize the costs of pollution
from the production process. Moreover, it could do so consistently with GATT
trade goals. GATT is premised on the economic principle of comparative
advantage. That principle works efficiently only if the prices of goods reflect
their real marginal costs. To achieve that, it is necessary to internalize to the
producer at least the truly significant costs to society of producing the goods,
such as measurable damage caused by water or air pollution from waste
discharge. It would be extremely difficult to tailor international regulations to
such situations through the normal, cumbersome treaty-making process or even
through individual GATT waivers. That would be so whether the regulations
16. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, art. 90(a),
61 Stat. 1180, 1205, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 356.
17. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL),
Nov. 2, 1973, art. 16, 12 I.L.M. 1319, 1330-33; Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978).
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are in the form of harmonizing measures designed to impose roughly the same
requirements on producers in some or all member states, or in the form of
tailored authorizations for unilateral import measures designed to make the
cost of goods produced with environmental externalities reflect their true
marginal production cost.
Professor Richard Stewart's paper points out that it would be impractical-
even counterproductive in trade policy terms-to try to eliminate all cost
differentials among countries not based on "natural" factors." That is surely
correct, but his admonition should not apply to the internalizing of truly
significant external production costs. One might note, for example, that the
International Labor Organization (ILO) already does this through conventions
that have the effect of internalizing to producers some significant health and
.welfare costs otherwise borne by workers in countries lacking self-generated
domestic legislation to protect them.' 9 At present, the ILO does not try to do
this through the tacit-consent and opt-out procedure I have suggested for the
GATT, but it could if the ILO Constitution were amended. So could GATT,
with an amendment or annex to the Agreement.
My colleague, David Wirth, has noted the lack of opportunity for public
input into many rule-making decisions by international bodies. 20 This could be
an inadequacy in the proposed GATT tacit-consent and opt-out procedure if
it involves only representatives of governments. To take care of the problem,
some form of public participation could be injected into the preparatory process
for adoption of rules by the tacit-consent and opt-out procedure. This could
be done when governments are consulted before a proposed rule is first adopted,
or perhaps through participation by nongovernmental organizations in the
adoption sessions, or in other ways.
Neither the GATT nor its dispute-settlement process irrevocably stands in
the way of effective environmental protection, either by restrained unilateral
measures or (preferably) by collective ones.2' GATT-bashing should cease, and
our attention should turn to more constructive ways to harmonize environment
and trade goals. Happily, that is what the papers in this symposium set out
to do.
18. Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal
Experience, 49 WAm. AND LEE L. REv. 1329 (1992).
19. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, June 25,
1990, 73 ILO OrrxcLul BuIn., ser. A, No. 2, at 71 (1990).
20. See David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge: Marrying International Law and
American Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377, 381-83, 417 (1992).
21. See David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making Processes in International Environ-
mental Law (forthcoming 1993) (on file with David Wirth).
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